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ABSTRACT 
 
The underlying reality of fertility intentions, expectations and preferences tends to be 
taken for granted. This is a natural consequence of the assumption, implicit or explicit in 
most demographic research, that fertility behaviour is governed by rational choice.  We 
question the reality of fertility intentions, expectations, and preferences, and propose 
instead that they are by and large constructed. Drawing on behavioural economics, 
psychology, and political science, we develop an outline theory of fertility intentions and 
preferences that contrasts with the classical rational choice model assumed in most work 
in this area.  
 
We show that there is a relatively high frequency of uncertain responses to questions on 
fertility intentions and expectations and argue that the uncertainty expressed is genuine. It 
was largely in response to this finding that our theoretical approach was developed. The 
presence of uncertain answers to preference and intentions questions is acknowledged in 
most demographic surveys but their frequency and theoretical and empirical significance 
has been largely neglected.   
 
Preferred family size may, we suggest, be a discovery rather than a goal. Demographic 
thinking about fertility decisions could be enriched by adopting the idea of constructed 
preferences from behavioural economics and psychology, together with ideas and debates 
in political science regarding survey response. The construction of fertility preferences 
and intentions can account for some hitherto unexplained anomalies in survey findings on 
fertility intentions and expectations. Preference construction theory provides a novel 
perspective on fertility intentions and preferences and on family building behaviour, and 
merits serious empirical investigation in this context. 
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 “It  is  perhaps  a  testimony  to  the  coerciveness  of  interview  situations  how  rarely 
participants say don't know, much less try to bolt…” (Fischhoff 1991) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Data on fertility preferences and intentions have been collected in demographic surveys for 
many decades in a wide range of contexts. They are analysed for a variety of purposes, most 
notably to interpret past trends, to gauge future prospects, and to develop an understanding of 
reproductive decision making. However, it has long been known that intentions, expectations 
and preferences can be quite inconsistent with eventual fertility outcomes, at both individual 
and aggregate levels (Morgan 2001). This is at odds with the classical rational choice model 
implicit in most of the literature on family formation. The rational choice model, with its 
assumption that people have clear preferences and goals, has increasingly been challenged in 
recent years not only in psychology and sociology but also in economics (Kahneman 1996, 
Smelser 1998, Bruni and Sugden 2007).  
 
 The aim of the present paper is to develop an outline theory of fertility intentions and 
preferences as an alternative to the classical rational choice model implicit in much of the 
demographic literature on family formation. We adapt ideas from behavioural economics and 
political science to argue that fertility intentions and preferences might usefully be thought of 
as constructed.  
 
 Our approach is primarily motivated by the finding that the frequency of uncertain 
answers to survey questions on intentions and expectations is relatively high, higher than is 
generally appreciated. In Britain in recent years around two fifths of women aged under 35 
were unsure whether they would have a (further) birth. This figure changed little between 
1991 and 2007 and so is not an isolated estimate (Ní Bhrolcháin, Beaujouan and Berrington 
2010; Ní Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan 2011). That so many should be unsure about their 
prospective fertility appears at first glance surprising, since uncertainty is largely absent from 
both theoretical and empirical accounts of reproductive decisions: the relatively high 
prevalence of uncertainty in fertility intentions data has been largely overlooked in the recent 
literature. 
 
 Although it was recognised at least as long ago as the 1955 Growth of American 
Families study that women and couples may be uncertain in their fertility intentions, 
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uncertainty was not reported explicitly in the early American fertility surveys. It was present 
only implicitly in tabulations of maximum, minimum and most likely expected births, 
derived from answers expressed in terms of ranges. It was not until Morgan’s (1981, 1982) 
pioneering work that the issue received serious demographic attention in its own right. 
Morgan established that uncertain fertility intentions were not simply a form of nonresponse 
but were meaningful in themselves. While many demographic surveys have since recognised 
the need to record respondents’ level of certainty about their fertility expectations, Morgan’s 
broader themes have been addressed by only a few demographic authors (Schaeffer and 
Thomson 1992, Johnson-Hanks 2005). 
 
 Our paper builds on Morgan’s classic insights. We show that a relatively high 
prevalence of uncertainty is a robust finding, and suggest that uncertainty may be even more 
common than is indicated by standard questions. We then argue that uncertainty is a rational 
response to the developing life course, and provide evidence in support of this view. Finally, 
we propose a new theoretical approach to reproductive intentions and preferences. Our 
approach can explain the prevalence of uncertainty, the instability of measured preferences 
and intentions, and their inconsistency with outcomes. We discuss also more general 
implications for ideas about reproductive decision-making. For economy, we focus 
exclusively on developed country data, but our themes are relevant in a less developed 
country context also (Agadjanian 2005; Johnson-Hanks 2005; Withers, Tayrow and Adinata 
2011).  
 
 The legacy of several decades of analysis and debate has left its mark on current ideas 
about reproductive intentions, and so we start with a brief historical background. Throughout, 
we use the terms ‘fertility intentions’ and ‘fertility expectations’ interchangeably: while the 
concepts differ in principle, individual survey responses to these questions are close to 
identical (Ryder and Westoff 1971; Morgan 2001). 
 
1.1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Fertility expectations data have been collected since the early post-war surveys of fertility in 
the US and in Britain. Interest in such data in the early American fertility surveys was largely 
practical, driven by their potential for improving population forecasts. The need arose from 
the then novel cohort component method of projection. Recognising that nothing was known 
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of the future fertility of the youngest cohorts, Whelpton proposed asking younger women 
themselves for the information. Hence, the Growth of American Families surveys in 1955 
and 1960 were undertaken primarily to assess the reliability of fertility expectations and their 
utility for population projection (Freedman, Whelpton and Campbell 1959; Whelpton, 
Campbell and Patterson 1966; Kiser 1967). The subsequent National Fertility Surveys of 
1965 and 1970 were much less focussed on projection issues, though influential in 
identifying the limitations of birth expectations data for the purpose (Ryder and Westoff 
1971, Westoff and Ryder 1977). Even so, the potential utility of birth expectations for 
forecasting motivated comparable surveys elsewhere into the 1970s and is suggested to have 
been the basis for European support for the World Fertility Survey series (Woolf 1971; 
Woolf and Pegden 1976; Ryder 1986). 
 
By the 1980s, evidence from several decades of research was consistent on several 
points, as follows. The agreement between fertility intentions and outcome was much better 
in the aggregate than for individuals. Nevertheless, when aggregated, fertility intentions did 
not perform well enough for use in forecasting—they appeared to reflect current fertility 
conditions or those of the recent past rather than future prospects (Westoff and Ryder 1977; 
Lee 1980,1981). Compared with other individual characteristics, intentions were strong 
predictors of fertility outcomes at the individual level, but their predictive power was 
nevertheless modest. Fertility intentions were not fixed but varied through the life course 
(Westoff, Mishler and Kelly 1957; Bumpass and Westoff 1970; Freedman, Freedman and 
Thornton 1980). Prospective and retrospective reporting of pregnancy intentions often 
disagreed, and these could be so inconsistent with contraceptive practice that leading scholars 
began to regard such data with considerable scepticism (see e.g. Ryder 1973, 1979). 
 
 This broad picture remains valid to the present1 and it is therefore unsurprising that a 
study conducted in the late 1990s found that few national statistical agencies used fertility 
intentions in formulating assumptions for population projection (Van Hoorn and Keilman 
1997). Nevertheless, intentions data continue to attract demographic attention as predictors of 
                                                 
1 Thomson and Brandreth (1995), Van Hoorn and Keilman (1997), Trussell, Vaughan and Stanford 
(1999), Morgan (2001), Santelli, Rochat, Hatfield-Timajchy et al. (2003) 
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individual-level fertility outcomes.2 Beyond their utility in this respect, data on reproductive 
orientation have several further established roles for research and policy purposes: in 
assessing how far social differentials in family size are due to varying family size desires, in 
reflecting couple dynamics, in characterising the reproductive life cycle, in evaluating the 
causes of aggregate change, in shaping and monitoring policy in relation to unintended 
pregnancy, particularly in the United States, in measuring “unmet need” for family planning 
in less developed countries, and in assessing the prospects for aggregate fertility.3 
 
 In sum, questions on fertility expectations originated as a practical statistical device—
one solution to the problem of forecasting fertility, especially that of younger cohorts. The 
limited success of intentions data in predicting fertility outcomes, at both individual and 
aggregate levels, has given rise to scepticism. Reproductive intentions and attitudes have 
been subject to an array of criticisms: that they are meaningless, superficial, guarded 
responses, biased by social desirability effects, that they represent “irresponsible” attitudes 
or, are subject to measurement error, random answers, and even possibly mendacious.4 
Nevertheless, sceptics have tended to assume that true reproductive intentions exist and that 
the problem is that they are mis-measured or misreported in demographic surveys. 
Conceptually, they lack a theoretical pedigree, being rooted in no formal psychological, 
sociological, economic, or demographic representation of reproductive behaviour (Coombs 
1974, Thomson and Brandreth 1995), though they currently feature in several social-
psychological theoretical frameworks (Ajzen 1991; Miller and Pasta 1995; Heckhausen, 
Wrosch and Fleeson 2001). Their experimental origins, accumulated empirical performance, 
and persisting contested status among scholars suggest a strong case for reconsidering the 
underlying reality of fertility intentions. 
 
                                                 
2Rindfuss, Morgan and Swicegood (1988), Monnier (1989), Schoen, Astone, Kim et al. (1999), 
Quesnel-Vallee and Morgan (2003), Toulemon and Testa (2005), Testa and Toulemon (2006), 
Liefbroer (2009), Philipov (2009), Speder and Kapitany (2009), Morgan and Rackin (2010). 
3 Ryder and Westoff (1971), Westoff and Ryder (1977), Morgan (1985), Williams and Thomson 
(1985), Westoff (1988), Thomson, Mcdonald and Bumpass (1990), Dixon-Mueller and Germain 
(1992), Brown and Eisenberg (1995), Thomson (1997), Thomson and Hoem (1998), Casterline and 
Sinding (2000), Bongaarts (2002), Berrington (2004), Finer and Henshaw (2006), Hayford and 
Morgan (2008), Hayford (2009), Liefbroer (2009), Musick, England, Edgington et al. (2009), Rosina 
and Testa (2009), Iacovou and Tavares (2011). 
4 Hauser (1967), Bumpass and Westoff (1970): 19, Ryder and Westoff (1971), Cartwright (1976), 
Westoff and Ryder (1977), Ryder (1979): 118, Ryder (1985), Demeny (1988), Thomson and 
Brandreth (1995), Bankole and Westoff (1998), Bachrach and Newcomer (1999), Hayford (2009), 
Kodzi, Casterline and Aglobitse (2010), Demographic and Health Surveys (2011): 84 
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from 1991 onwards only are shown in Figure 1.5,6  Two features are noteworthy in this graph. 
First, the overall level of uncertainty is fairly substantial. Just over 30 per cent of all women 
aged 18-44 are unsure whether they will have (more) children, this proportion being the 
highest, close to 40 per cent, for women in each age group under 35. Second, we see also 
from Figure 1 that there was little change between 1991 and 2005/7 in the level of 
uncertainty, though a slight upward trend among women 35+. The high frequency of 
uncertainty is, thus, consistent across 17 years of repeated surveys and is not just an isolated 
observation. 
 
The prevalence of uncertain fertility intentions in Britain is not unusual. Comparable 
levels are found in a range of other developed societies. We present elsewhere a cross-
national compilation of published estimates of the frequency of uncertain responses to 
fertility intentions and expectations questions (Ní Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan forthcoming). 
Among the 33 studies surveyed, few give a frequency of uncertainty below 10 per cent, 23 
record a frequency of 20 per cent or more and 18 a level of 30 per cent or more. The figure of 
40 per cent found at ages up to the mid-30s in the British GHS is matched or exceeded by the 
overall figures of half a dozen sources, covering the US and a range of European countries. 
Thus, the relatively high prevalence of uncertainty given by the GHS is not exceptional or 
implausible in the context of comparable studies, whether past or recent. 
 
 There are, furthermore, several reasons for thinking that the frequency of uncertain 
fertility intentions and preferences has often been underestimated. First, in many earlier 
surveys, particularly those predating the recognition of the significance of uncertainty 
(Morgan 1981, 1982), a tentative or “don’t know” response to a question on intended or 
expected family size was regarded as non-response (Werner 1986; Riley, Hermalin and 
Rosero-Bixby 1993; Van Hoorn and Keilman 1997).  People were assumed to have clear 
                                                 
5 The General Household Survey data series used in this paper are weighted throughout by a set of weights 
constructed on a consistent basis for annual GHS rounds from 1979 to 2007, for use in analysis of individuals 
responding to the Family Information section of the questionnaire with valid revised fertility histories. Further 
details of the revisions to the fertility histories are given in (Ní Bhrolcháin, Beaujouan and Murphy (2011)) and 
of the weights in (Beaujouan, Brown and Ní Bhrolcháin (2011). 
6 The birth expectations question is: “Do you think that you will have any (more) children (at all) (after the one 
you are expecting)?” The wording remained almost the same from 1979-2007 (with a minor change in 1995 and 
1996; see Smallwood and Jefferies 2003); the words “at all” were omitted from 1998 on. From 1979-1990 
precoded answer categories were “yes”, “no” and “don’t know”. From 1991 onwards, a showcard was used, 
with answer options “yes”, “probably yes”, “probably not”, and “no”. Those initially answering “don’t know” 
are probed further and recoded “probably yes” or “probably not” where possible. “Don’t know” and no answer 
are a small group, just 1%-2% overall, and 2%-8% of those classified here as uncertain. 
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fertility intentions, and interviewers were instructed to elicit an unambiguous declaration of 
these. The result is likely to have been an upward bias in the recorded level of certainty in 
fertility expectations. 
 
 In addition, being asked about their fertility intentions may itself convey to 
respondents that they ought to have clear-cut intentions (Cartwright 1976, Chapter 3, 
Cartwright and Wilkins 1976: 7-8, Simons 1978). A social desirability effect may prompt 
people who are uncertain to give a definite response (Westoff and Ryder 1977: 346). 
Respondents in fertility surveys may sometimes overstate how sure they are (Wikman 2006), 
or report what might be described as “nonintentions”, by analogy with nonattitudes in 
political science and basic values in psychology (Converse 1964, Fischhoff 1991). 
 
 The reported level of certainty may also be overstated as a result of a restricted set of 
precoded answers. Where “uncertain” or “don’t know” or equivalent pre-codes are not 
explicitly offered as options in survey questions, “don’t know” answers are less frequent 
(Converse 1974; Kaufmann, Morris and Spitz 1997; Krosnick 1999; Schaeffer and Presser 
2003).  We found evidence that fertility expectations suffer from this bias also in the annual 
GHS: in the years following the introduction of explicit uncertain precodes into the question 
on fertility expectations, the frequency of uncertain responses rose. Between 1990 and 1991, 
when “possibly” answers became available, uncertain answers increased from 9% to 29% (Ní 
Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan 2011: Figure 2). 
 
 Finally, the frequency of uncertain intentions may be underestimated for definitional 
reasons. The intentions question used here occurs in a wide range of demographic surveys, in 
this or closely similar form. It is nevertheless a rough and ready measure, chosen ad hoc, and 
with little or no validation. It has not been designed to measure uncertainty per se, and just as 
intentions are not dichotomous (Morgan 1981) so too certainty is unlikely to be a binary 
state. We therefore explore two further definitions by adding to the uncertain group defined 
above those answering “yes” to the intentions question who expect a birth in either (a) 5+ 
years’ time or (b) 3+ years’ time (fuller details are given in Ní Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan 
2011). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 
age. W
 
Source
 
 
 
younger
doubles
include
years. A
25-29, 3
three in
their fu
            
7 To coun
justificati
time hori
and Gene
uncertain
time disp
feature is
1991-200
next birth
heaping 
should b
uncertain
2: Proportion
omen aged 18
: Centre for P
On these 
 women ri
 from an o
d, and rises
t ages 20-2
9 per cent,
 five of wo
ture childb
                  
t as uncertain
on. Medium 
zon for expec
rations Progr
ty. The distri
lays substant
 less pronoun
5/7, Whipple
 is 1 to 2 y
observed is p
e coded 22, 
ty on the resp
 uncertain, ac
‐44. GB, GHS
opulation Cha
expanded 
ses dramat
riginal 41 
 further to 
4, compar
 47 per cen
men under 
earing.7  I
                  
 those expect
to long time 
tations in a n
amme. Addit
bution of the
ial heaping, 
ced, though 
 indices for th
ears, and for 
artly due to 
in the mid-20
ondent’s part
cording to th
 1991‐2005/7
nge GHS time
definitions,
ically (Figu
per cent to
90 per cen
able figures
t and 61 per
35, and abo
f uncertain
 
ing a wait of 
horizons mus
umber of surv
ional evidenc
 expected age
and the long
still present, 
e distribution
3+ years bet
interviewer in
s 25, and so
 as much as w
ree definition
. 
 series data f
 the estim
re 2). At a
 84 per cen
t with the i
 are 39 per
 cent, respe
ut one in f
ty in inten
3+ years to th
t involve som
eys with a fo
e from the GH
 at next birth
er the expect
among those 
 of age at nex
ween 157 an
structions wh
 on. Howeve
ould direct re
s, as to whet
ile. 
ated preva
ges 18-19,
t when exp
nclusion of
 cent, 67 pe
ctively. On
ive of those
tions is as
eir first/next b
e uncertainty
llow-up comp
S supports th
 given by wo
ed delay, the
expecting a b
t birth are be
d 231, depen
ich specify t
r, such answ
ports of 22, 2
 
her they will h
lence of u
 the freque
ected dela
 those expe
r cent and 
 the most i
 aged 35-4
 common 
irth is arbitra
, and three y
onent, such a
e of 3+ year
men expectin
 more heaped
irth in 1-2 ye
tween 115 an
ding on the a
hat e.g. an an
ers are appro
5, 28, 30 and
ave a furthe
ncertainty 
ncy of unc
ys of 5+ y
cting a wa
81 per cen
nclusive de
4, are unsu
as this, sig
ry and may n
ears is the lim
s the UN EC
s criterion as 
g a birth in 
 the distribu
ars’ time. In
d 140 when th
ge range cho
swer in the 
ximate, and 
 so on. 
 
8
r birth, by 
among 
ertainty 
ears are 
it of 3+ 
t, and at 
finition, 
re about 
nificant 
eed some 
it of the 
E Gender 
reflecting 
3+ years’ 
tion. The 
 the GHS 
e time to 
sen. The 
early 20s 
so reflect 
  
 
9
questions arise about the nature and interpretation of fertility intentions, about the levels of 
uncertainty measured in a wide range of fertility surveys, and about fertility decisions per se.8  
 
 In sum, the prevalence of uncertainty is fairly high in developed societies, and there 
are indications that its frequency may be underestimated in existing sources. Being a 
somewhat neglected issue, the relatively high prevalence of uncertainty suggests that it may 
offer a route to a better understanding of the reproductive life course, if the phenomenon can 
be shown to reflect something real. In the next section, we present arguments and evidence 
that support the reality of uncertain fertility intentions. In a later section, we go on to outline a 
theoretical approach to fertility preferences that can explain the level of uncertainty, the 
instability of intentions, and their inconsistency with fertility outcomes. 
 
3. ARE PEOPLE REALLY UNCERTAIN ABOUT THEIR FUTURE 
FERTILITY? 
How should we interpret the high prevalence of uncertainty documented in the previous 
section? In much of the previous literature the high frequency of “don’t know” or ambiguous 
answers is downplayed in a number of ways—either don’t know answers are overlooked and 
omitted from analysis entirely or uncertainty is attributed to factors such as poor 
measurement and lack of respondent motivation or knowledge. By contrast, we believe that 
unsure answers should be taken seriously--that the uncertainty expressed about future fertility 
is both genuine and well founded. 
 
 The GHS question elicits expectations regarding a future/the next birth. This style of 
question is regarded as more reliable than questions on the number of intended or expected 
births (Casterline and El-Zeini 2007). The question is simple and realistic. Women are asked 
only whether they expect to have a (further) birth ever, rather than to express an imaginary 
ideal, as in some demographic surveys. An uncertain response to this type of question 
appears unlikely to be due to lack of knowledge or understanding. We propose that the 
uncertainty expressed in answers to questions on intentions regarding a future/the next birth, 
and reflected also in questions on expected age, is both real and reasonable. We suggest that 
it is not primarily the result of mis-measurement, though some role for the latter cannot be 
                                                 
8 Substantial uncertainty about the timing of first birth is reported by Rindfuss et al (1988: 195-6), with 29% of 
childless women and 43% of childless men in their early to mid-twenties answering “don’t know” to a question 
on when they expected to have their first child. 
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ruled out. In the present section we draw on demographic and other evidence to argue this 
case. 
 
3.1. UNCERTAINTY IN THE CONTEXT OF PREFERENCES 
Consider the conditions under which people could be reasonably sure about their future 
fertility. Imagine a society in which some form of sexual union is universal, that sexual 
unions begin at puberty and continue uninterrupted to menopause, that everybody has the 
same level of fecundity, that no steps are taken to control fertility and that childbearing is not 
in competition with other activities. In such a society the vast majority of people could be 
fairly sure of their reproductive futures. Individuals in real-life developed societies 
experience conditions far from this hypothetical scenario, and have multiple grounds for 
being uncertain about their future fertility. Except for post-menopausal women and people 
who know themselves to be sterile, most people in modern developed societies cannot be sure 
of how their future reproductive lives will play out.  
 
 We elaborate below on the principal reasons why a person may (and should) be 
unsure of their reproductive expectations in a modern developed society. These are 
considered under three scenarios: where a person’s reproductive preferences are unclear, 
where they are clear and positive, or clear and negative. We discuss fertility preferences and 
intentions in general, and do not distinguish at this stage between preferences/intentions for 
having a family per se, or for specific family sizes, or specific timing, since little is known 
about the origin and inter-relation of these separate aspects. 
 
3.1.1. INDIFFERENCE, WEAK OR UNCLEAR PREFERENCES  
People may be unsure of what they want by way of family size, or timing. They may never 
have thought about the issue and have no preference at all. They may alternatively have 
thought about it and have weak preferences, or are ambivalent, or just do not know what they 
want (Schaeffer and Thomson 1992). This does not mean that they do not care at all either 
about having a family or about family size. Rather, the prospect may have little salience. This 
could occur if they are at too early a life stage to have formed specific views and preferences 
about childbearing, or too occupied with other activities to have considered the matter in 
detail. They may be without a partner and the prospect of childbearing may therefore be an 
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abstract one. For all these reasons, fertility preferences may be ill-defined and this seems 
particularly likely at younger ages.  
 
 Where people are either ambivalent about fertility, or unclear in what they want, or 
have weak preferences, or no preferences at all, it would be unsurprising if they have no clear 
intentions or expectations in relation to fertility. A lack of clear preferences may thus explain 
what we saw earlier in Figure 2 at younger ages: that on our extended definition, the vast 
majority of young women are uncertain about their fertility intentions. We saw that it is not 
until the early 30s that a majority respond with certainty to the question on birth expectations. 
 
3.1.2. CLEAR POSITIVE PREFERENCES  
In contrast to the previous scenario, let us consider people who have clear, unambiguous 
preferences for (further) childbearing. Does this imply that their fertility intentions will 
necessarily be clear, unambiguous, unconditional? We believe not. Even where desires and 
goals are clear, limitations of fecundity, of control, and of knowledge preclude complete 
certainty about realizing these, and so limit intentions and expectations. 
 
 Those with a clear desire to have (more) children cannot be certain about their future 
fecundity, particularly if they have never been exposed to the risk of pregnancy. We would 
therefore expect uncertainty to be age related and this is indeed the case. Among women aged 
under 30 the percent sterile and unable to have a live birth is low (below10 percent), based on 
estimates from a number of sources. However, at age 30 the estimates range from 7 per cent 
to 12 per cent, and at 35 from 13 per cent to 22 per cent (Leridon 2008: Table 3). Beyond 
fecundity is the issue of finding a partner with whom to have children. People who already 
have a partner cannot be sure that the union will remain intact. People who are not in a union 
cannot be sure of finding a partner, or the right partner, with whom to have a child or children 
(Zabin, Huggins, Emerson et al. 2000, Testa 2007). Thus, even where people have a clear 
preference for childbearing, they cannot be sure that they will achieve this in the future, and 
so cannot reasonably intend or expect to do so. 
  
 Data from the GHS of 2000-2007 give statistical substance to these points. Figure 3 
shows the proportion of women having a birth within 10 years of initial observation, by 
initial age and parity, among respondents to the General Household Surveys of 2000-2005/7. 
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instability of preferences and intentions across the life course has been documented by 
several decades of research. In addition, the future preferences of any current or future 
partner are also unknown. Evidence that this matters is of two kinds. First, the preferences of 
the partners in a union can differ appreciably and are independently associated with fertility 
outcomes.9 Second, fertility expectations predict subsequent outcomes less well among 
women who were not in a union at initial contact.10 In addition, women without a partner 
more often express uncertain fertility intentions (O’Connell and Rogers 1983, Ní Bhrolcháin 
and Beaujouan 2011). The very early fertility surveys asked fertility intentions questions only 
of married women, but in recent decades these questions are put to all women, whether in a 
union or not. Ryder (1984) was of the view that the fertility intentions of unmarried women 
(and we can probably extend the point to the unpartnered) were particularly unlikely to be 
trustworthy, precisely because fertility prospects are, in the main, subject to additional 
uncertainty for women not in a union. 
 
3.1.3. CLEAR NEGATIVE PREFERENCES 
Finally, if we consider people who have clear and unambiguous preferences not to have 
(further) children, comparable difficulties of knowledge and control arise. Those who want 
no (more) children cannot, without abstinence, sterility, or sterilization, be sure that they will 
avoid future pregnancy. A recent estimate puts the proportion of all pregnancies in developed 
countries that are unintended at 47 per cent (Singh, Sedgh and Hussain 2010). Nor can people 
know for certain how either they or a current or future partner would react in the event of 
pregnancy. From longitudinal studies, the proportion of women initially stating an intention 
not to have a birth who have had a birth on follow up ranges between 7 per cent and 25 per 
cent, in studies with varying lengths of follow up.  
 
 To sum up, in all scenarios from weak or absent fertility preferences to strong and 
unambiguous childbearing preferences, there are sound reasons for being uncertain in 
intentions and expectations. Uncertainty in relation to fertility intentions is a perfectly 
reasonable, indeed rational, response to the imperfect information people have about their 
reproductive prospects. 
                                                 
9 Thomson, Mcdonald and Bumpass (1990), Thomson (1997), Berrington (2004), Jansen and Liefbroer (2006), 
Liefbroer (2009), Rosina and Testa (2009) 
10 Schoen, Astone, Kim et al. (1999), Quesnel-Vallee and Morgan (2003), Berrington (2004), Toulemon and 
Testa (2005), Testa (2007), Morgan and Rackin (2010) 
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3.2. FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT UNCERTAINTY IS GENUINE 
Two further types of evidence suggest that it is reasonable on statistical grounds to be 
uncertain about future childbearing intentions: inconsistency between stated intentions and 
completed fertility, and variance in the age at first birth. 
 
 Evidence that fertility expectations lack predictive validity at both individual and 
aggregate levels has accumulated over several decades. Several longitudinal studies since the 
late 1960s have examined the consistency of initial intentions/expectations with subsequent 
outcomes. In most of these, between 40 per cent and 70 per cent of those stating an intention 
to have a (further) birth at initial interview had not carried out their intention by the time of 
follow up (ranging from 2 to 18 years later).11 These studies also show much greater 
consistency between intention and outcome among those not intending a (further) birth. 
There is thus a substantial mis-match between initial positive intentions and both shorter and 
longer term outcomes, and lesser but still non-negligible levels of inconsistency among those 
with negative intentions. These statistics in themselves underline it is reasonable to be 
uncertain in relation to fertility expectations. Adding weight to this point, the uncertain 
expectations of those initially declaring themselves unsure are borne out in subsequent years:  
they are less likely to carry out the intention, whether positive or negative, than are those who 
initially declared themselves certain.  
 
 The second statistical basis for uncertainty among childless women in relation to 
childbearing is the wide dispersion in the age at first birth. In Britain in 2009, the 25th 
percentile of the age specific first birth schedule was 23.7 and the 75th, 35.1, giving an 
interquartile range of 11.4 years. While individual women cannot be aware of these 
demographic quantities, it seems likely that the substantial variability in the age at first birth 
is a known feature of women’s lives. 
 
                                                 
11 Sources on the subject include the following: (Bumpass and Westoff (1969), Cartwright and Wilkins (1976), 
Westoff and Ryder (1977), Freedman, Freedman and Thornton (1980), Noack and Ostby (1985), Rindfuss, 
Morgan and Swicegood (1988), Monnier (1989), Schoen, Astone, Kim et al. (1999), Noack and Ostby (2002), 
Quesnel-Vallee and Morgan (2003), Berrington (2004), Toulemon and Testa (2005), Testa and Toulemon 
(2006), Liefbroer (2009), Philipov (2009), Speder and Kapitany (2009), Morgan and Rackin (2010) 
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 In all, there are strong empirical grounds for the proposition that uncertainty about 
future fertility is a rational position for many people, much if not most of the time. That the 
frequency of reported uncertainty is high when uncertain answer options are available 
suggests that survey respondents are either explicitly or implicitly aware of this. Finally, the 
advent of near-perfect contraception has not altered the predictive power of fertility 
intentions and expectations data, indicating that there is a great deal more involved here than 
simple failure to control conception. 
 
3.3. AMBIGUITY IN PREGNANCY INTENTIONS 
A final body of evidence of pervasive ambiguity and lack of certainty underlying 
reproductive decisions is found in the field of family planning. In that literature, conventional 
concepts and measures of intended, wanted, and planned pregnancies have been challenged 
and debated in the last decade or so.12 Concern has arisen in particular from extensive 
evidence of inconsistency between reports of intention, desires, contraceptive use, and 
affective reaction to pregnancy. One pivotal study based on the 1995 National Survey of 
Family Growth found that 31 per cent of women reporting a contraceptive failure said the 
pregnancy was intended; of those with an unintended pregnancy, 25 per cent declared 
themselves happy or very happy to be pregnant (Trussell, Vaughan and Stanford 1999). 
Comparable discrepancies between stated intention, contraceptive use, and reaction to 
pregnancy in studies over a period spanning several decades13 has led investigators to seek 
more complex, multidimensional indicators of pregnancy intentions (Santelli, Rochat, 
Hatfield-Timajchy et al. 2003, Santelli, Lindberg, Orr et al. 2009). 
 
 Qualitative studies addressing these issues suggest that women do not always think of 
themselves, and cannot always be readily classified, as trying/not trying, or intending/not 
intending, to become pregnant, and that the idea of planning a pregnancy either is not 
understood or has negative connotations for some women (Barrett and Wellings 2002; 
Gerber, Pennylegion and Spice 2002; Kendall, Afable-Munsuz, Speizer et al. 2005). An 
unplanned pregnancy may furthermore be seen as advantageous, in removing the difficulty of 
deciding whether and when to have a child (Luker 1999, Lifflander, Gaydos and Rowland 
                                                 
12 Petersen and Moos (1997), Bachrach and Newcomer (1999), Luker (1999), Zabin (1999), Barrett and 
Wellings (2000, 2002), Santelli, Rochat, Hatfield-Timajchy et al. (2003), Esacove (2008) 
13 Cartwright (1970, 1976), Ryder (1976, 1979), Cartwright (1988), Moos, Petersen, Meadows et al. (1997), 
Sable and Libbus (2000), Petersen, Gazmararian, Clark et al. (2001), Higgins, Hirsch and Trussell (2008) 
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Hogue 2007). Ambiguity in pregnancy intentions has also been reported in larger scale 
studies. In McQuillan et al’s (2010) telephone survey, 23 per cent of women classified 
themselves as neither trying to become pregnant nor trying to avoid it, but were “okay either 
way.” Prospective studies reveal, in addition, that reports of the intendedness of a birth can 
change during the course of a pregnancy (Joyce, Kaestner and Korenman 2000, Poole, 
Flowers, Goldenberg et al. 2000). The picture emerging from this highly applied and focused 
body of work is that intentionality is more complex and fluid, and ambivalence more 
prevalent, than has been allowed for, conceptually and methodologically, in mainstream 
fertility surveys.14 
 
 To sum up, using a range of empirical evidence, we have argued in this section that 
the uncertainty in fertility intentions expressed in fertility surveys is genuine, rather than that 
uncertain responses reflect measurement error. We have also shown that uncertainty is a 
rational response to individuals’ fertility prospects, in a statistical sense. Finally, strong 
corroboration of these ideas is found in several decades of studies in the family planning 
literature that demonstrate much ambivalence and ambiguity in attitudes to pregnancy. 
4. A NEW THEORY OF FERTILITY PREFERENCES AND 
INTENTIONS 
The empirical findings presented here cannot be accommodated within existing theoretical 
frameworks. Our findings are inconsistent with the rational choice account that is implicit or 
explicit in theories of fertility decision making. In a means-end framework, preferences and 
intentions are clear-cut, and there is little or no role for uncertainty and ambiguity of desire 
and intent.15 We propose therefore a new theoretical approach to reproductive intentions and 
preferences, adapting insights from recent research in psychology and economics. Our aim is 
to present a realistic account of reproductive preference and choice that can accommodate the 
high prevalence of uncertainty to which we have drawn attention. The ideas share 
perspectives in common with developing ideas in the field, particularly those of Johnson-
Hanks (2005), Johnson-Hanks, Bachrach, Morgan et al. (2011), Morgan and Bachrach (2011) 
and Bachrach and Morgan (2013). 
                                                 
14 Kaufmann, Morris and Spitz (1997), Klerman (2000), Stanford, Hobbs, Jameson et al. (2000), Santelli, 
Rochat, Hatfield-Timajchy et al. (2003), Barrett, Smith and Wellings (2004), Finer and Henshaw (2006), 
Santelli, Lindberg, Orr et al. (2009) 
15 The pervasive survey practice of treating “don’t know” answers to intentions and preferences questions as 
non-response, and attempting to recode them, is a concrete expression of the assumption that intentions and 
preferences are clearly held. 
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4.1. AN OUTLINE OF PREFERENCE CONSTRUCTION THEORY 
We suggest that fertility preferences and intentions are generated by a constructive process.16 
Preference construction as a concept has developed at the intersection of psychology, 
economics, and behavioural decision theory. It is a response to recurring evidence that in 
many situations people’s preferences are changeable, context-dependent, and subject to 
framing effects (for an overview, see Lichtenstein and Slovic 2006). In particular, extensive 
experimental evidence of the reversal of preferences has challenged basic assumptions about 
preferences in the classical rational choice model (Tversky and Thaler 1990; Kahneman 
1994; Lichtenstein and Slovic 2006). Though a dynamic and evolving area of research in 
economics, psychology, and decision theory, the ideas appear as yet to have made little 
headway in sociology and demography. 
 
 If we view preferences as constructed, the high prevalence of uncertainty is no longer 
anomalous, but inherent to fertility preference and choice. The basic premise of the approach 
is that people do not always have clear preferences. Desires may be well-defined when it 
comes to simple choices that are frequently encountered, in familiar contexts, or in relation to 
somewhat more complex choices where social and cultural conditions have long been stable. 
Many choices are not of this type. They may have been encountered either rarely or never 
before, and may be one-off decisions. In these circumstances, people will often lack a clear 
preference—they may not know what to want or how to choose. When called on either to 
state a preference, or to act on one, they look for clues and make inferences as to what they 
would like, and thus how to act, or what preference to declare. In other words, rather than 
reading off their preference from a stored memory, they construct a preference from available 
information (Lichtenstein and Slovic 2006). In traditional thinking the reporting of a 
preference is like a form of archaeology but in the constructive account it is more akin to 
architecture (Payne, Bettman and Schkade 1999). The constructive view holds that a person 
identifying their own preference, or reporting a preference in a survey, is assembling a 
preference when requested, rather than retrieving and declaring a pre-existing one. An often 
                                                 
16 Preferences and intentions are considered jointly here. While conceptually distinct, the two are closely linked 
in practice, as desired family size seems to carry little information beyond that present in intended family size. 
Using the National Fertility Survey follow-up data, Ryder (1981) shows that change in intended parity is a 
significant predictor of change in desired parity 1970-1975, but that the reverse is not the case. In that sense he 
considers intended family size “causally prior” to desired family size. 
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quoted analogy illustrates the distinction between old and new perspectives on preferences 
and values via three baseball umpires: 
 
"I call them as I see them," said the first. "I call them as they are," claimed the second. The 
third disagreed, "They ain't nothing till I call them." Analogously, we can describe three 
different views regarding the nature of values. First, values exist—like body temperature—
and people perceive and report them as best they can, possibly with bias (I call them as I see 
them). Second, people know their values and preferences directly—as they know the 
multiplication table (I call them as they are). Third, values or preferences are commonly 
constructed in the process of elicitation (they ain't nothing till I call them). 
Tversky and Thaler (1990: 210) 
4.2. FERTILITY INTENTIONS AND PREFERENCES AS CONSTRUCTED 
In the constructive interpretation, preferences are assembled in different ways for different 
types of choice (Bettman, Luce and Payne 1998). In family formation there are, we suggest, 
two distinct expressions of preferences—those operating in family building itself, and those 
reflected in responses to survey questions. We term these effective preferences and stated 
preferences, respectively17 and suggest that they result from different constructive processes. 
Our account of effective preferences is rooted in the psychology and economics literature. 
We look to political science for insights on stated preferences. 
 
 Proponents of preference construction do not see all preferences as constructed. In 
simple, repeated and familiar choices, such as supporting one football team rather than 
another, preferences are stored in memory. By contrast, when situations are unfamiliar, or 
when trade-offs are necessary between elements of a choice situation, or when a person is 
asked to express a preference numerically, a constructive process is hypothesised as operating 
(Fischhoff 2006, Lichtenstein and Slovic 2006). Childbearing in developed societies fits these 
conditions well. Building a family of their own is a novel experience for most people, and is 
usually encountered only once. Trade-offs are certainly present, there being multiple 
competing claims on a woman’s or couple’s time and resources besides bearing and rearing 
children. Finally, preferences are elicited in numerical terms in survey questions on the 
number of children desired/intended, or the expected timing of a birth. 
                                                 
17 The term “stated preferences” is also used in applied economics (see e.g. Carlsson 2010). 
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 Reproductive orientation has several other features characteristic of constructive 
preferences. We saw earlier that many women’s intentions are unclear, and so we have 
explicit evidence that preferences are not always well-articulated. Key evidence for the 
constructive nature of preferences is that preferences are both labile and differ systematically 
depending on the method by which they are elicited. Both of these features are characteristic 
of fertility preferences and intentions. Several decades of research has shown that they are 
unstable,18 and can be quite inconsistent with fertility outcomes (note 19 above), and both 
features continue to be found in recent sources.  
 
 The explanations offered in the demographic literature for labile preferences and 
disparities between birth expectations and ultimate fertility include unrealistic preferences, 
constraint, change in circumstances, change of mind, thoughtless responses, measurement 
error, and the like. The constructive interpretation provides an alternative explanation of both 
instability and inconsistency. Fertility preferences are unstable, on the constructive 
hypothesis, because they are ill-defined, especially at young ages, and also because they are 
context-dependent. They are inconsistent with outcomes both for this reason and because 
actual childbearing and survey reports of preferences/intentions are quite different modes of 
expressing preferences. 
 
 If childbearing preferences are entirely constructed, it follows that there is no “true” 
underlying preference in relation to family size—at any rate before preferences converge on a 
stable state. In the most extreme form of this idea, survey questions on intentions/preferences 
are attempting to measure something that either does not exist or has only a shadowy 
existence: people making choices about childbearing, or declaring a preference in this 
respect, have to work out what they want, rather than simply consulting some mental master-
list of known desires (see also Greil and Mcquillan 2010: 140). Less extreme versions of the 
idea can, of course, also be considered: for example, preferences may be inherent to some 
extent, and may vary in degree of construction both between individuals and across the life 
course (Simonson 2008). 
 
                                                 
18 Freedman, Coombs and Bumpass (1965), Bumpass and Westoff (1970), Cartwright and Wilkins (1976), 
Freedman, Freedman and Thornton (1980), Berrington (2004), Heiland, Prskawetz and Sanderson (2008), 
Liefbroer (2009), Iacovou and Tavares (2011) 
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 If, as we suggest, fertility preferences are constructed, how does this occur, and what 
influences the process? In the sections that follow, we sketch some outline ideas, based on 
our findings to date. We conclude with some thoughts on how the subject can be pursued 
empirically. 
 
 We saw above that almost all of the youngest women are uncertain about prospective 
childbearing but that older women are surer of their expectations (Figure 2). We show 
elsewhere that uncertainty varies largely with age and demographic life stage—partnership 
status, parity, time since previous birth—and relatively little with socio-economic factors or 
calendar time; net of other factors, women not in a union are more uncertain than others, as 
are those of lower parity, and those who have had a birth more recently (Ní Bhrolcháin and 
Beaujouan 2011). Similar associations are reported in other studies. O’Connell and Rogers 
(1983) found that single women were more uncertain about birth expectations than were 
married women. Declines in uncertainty with age or parity, or with both, are evident in the 
studies of Morgan (1982), Monnier (1989), Wu and Wang (1998), Berrington (2004) and 
Sobotka (2009). 
 
 These results are what we would expect from a constructive process in which young 
people do not have well-defined childbearing preferences, but that preferences develop over 
time. Young adults’ effective preferences—those influencing actual childbearing—are, we 
hypothesise, generated by encounters with choices and contingencies, and by learning from 
experience and observation, under the real conditions in which their lives play out. From 
repeated exposure to reproductive choices, preferences and intentions ultimately stabilize. 
Empirical evidence shows that fertility intentions are less volatile at older ages, as would be 
expected on the constructive account.19 
 
 Our hypothesis differs from the proposition that people start off in young adulthood 
with well-articulated preferences and simply change their minds over time (Iacovou and 
Tavares 2011). Our view differs also from the idea that underlying preferences and intentions 
exist, are badly measured by conventional questions but better identified by more complex 
measuring instruments such as the Coombs scale (Coombs 1978, Coombs and Freedman 
1979). We suggest instead that at young ages preferences are vague and unclear, but become 
                                                 
19 Berrington (2004), Heiland, Prskawetz and Sanderson (2008), Iacovou and Tavares (2011); see also 
Kahneman (1996) on how we would expect an agent whose preferences are constructed to act. 
  
 
22
more concrete with age, being generated through life-course experience. The changeability of 
the preferences and intentions of the young is well documented as is their frequent 
inconsistency with subsequent behaviour. This is often interpreted as reflecting a lack of 
realism in the fertility expectations of young people. In our view, the lack of realism pertains 
to the survey practice of asking questions on fertility preferences and expectations of people 
who are at an age when their desires and expectations are vague or unformed. Preferences 
and intentions are unstable, we suggest, because they are constructed, and this also explains 
their often weak correspondence with subsequent outcomes. 
 
 Our hypothesis is similar to the shaping hypothesis of Loomes et al (2003) in relation 
to economic choices. In Loomes et al’s hypothesis, the primary influences are market prices, 
but in the fertility case the influences would, of course, be different. The shaping hypothesis 
is distinct from Plott’s (1996) discovered preference hypothesis, in which people learn by 
trial and error what their true preferences are. In Plott’s account, the preferences ‘discovered’ 
are pre-existing and inherent, rather than constructed and influenced by experience. Under 
the shaping hypothesis and in a radical version of our proposal, there are no true, underlying 
fertility preferences at the earliest ages. Preferences are, rather, literally generated by 
experience as time goes by. At later ages, therefore, people’s preferences in relation to 
fertility depend importantly on their experience before the point of choice or survey 
observation. 
 
Nevertheless, the term “discovery” expresses our meaning well. People arrive, 
through a sequence of stages, at a family size that they “discover” to be right for them, their 
preferences having been shaped and developed by experience. Thus, fertility preferences 
could be said to be discovered but in a sense different from Plott’s. In essence, through the 
life course people happen on a family size that is satisfactory and that becomes their 
preference, rather than that they uncover a latent preference that has always been there. These 
ideas are similar to those of Simons (1974) who suggested that the findings on intentions and 
fertility outcomes could be interpreted as indicating that “individuals discover, by reaching it, 
the family size at which they wish to cease childbearing.” Our approach has much in 
common also with Morgan’s schematic model (Morgan 1982: 332), with Johnson-Hanks 
(2005) and with the theory of conjunctural action (Johnson-Hanks, Bachrach, Morgan et al. 
2011, Morgan and Bachrach 2011) as well as with the cognitive-social model of Bachrach 
and Morgan (2013). 
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 Our proposal can be encapsulated by saying that preferred family size is a discovery 
rather than a goal. But that does not imply that family formation always results in a perfect 
match between preferences and outcome. People may discover, too late, that they would have 
preferred either fewer or more children than they eventually have. Such disparities can arise 
because of lack of information. A particularly interesting type of information deficit is that 
people may not know, or may be mistaken about, what will make them happy in the future—
variously referred to in the psychological literature as miswanting or failure of affective 
forecasting or of hedonic prediction (Kahneman 1994; Gilbert and Wilson 2000; Wilson and 
Gilbert 2005). In the case of childbearing, a person may find that a disparity between 
preference and actuality cannot be corrected, either because there is no culturally acceptable 
solution to the problem of having had too many children, or that age, fecundity or other 
constraints limit the achievement of a preferred fertility outcome. Dissatisfaction of this type 
need not result from failure to reach a clearly held goal, but from the realisation that the 
outcome of a series of decisions, taken one at a time, is, in the event, less preferred than a 
hypothetical alternative.20 
 
4.3. RESPONSES TO SURVEY QUESTIONS 
One criterion by which preferences are judged to be constructed is that the responses of the 
same individual will differ systematically according to how they are elicited or expressed 
(Slovic 1995). Thus, how people report preferences in response to survey questions—stated 
preferences—may differ from how they identify their preferences when acting to have or not 
have a (further) child—effective preferences—because the constructive process differs in 
each case. Effective preferences will no doubt influence stated preferences, but the latter may 
reflect other factors also. It has long been known in the demographic literature that the 
desired family size reported by individuals can shift, either up or down, in response to the 
occurrence or not of a birth. Preferences to some extent follow fertility performance, as 
distinct from determining it. Furthermore, people appear to reinterpret their past preferences 
to fit their accumulated behaviour. In a sample of engaged couples first contacted in the early 
1930s and followed up in 1953-54, Westoff et al (1957) found that actual family size in 1953-
54 was more strongly correlated with their recall in 1953-54 of what they wanted 20 years 
earlier than with the preferences they had actually declared two decades before. That is, they 
                                                 
20 On post-decision surprise, see (Goitein,1984), Harrison and March (1984) 
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misremembered their previous preferences as more consistent with their current 
circumstances than was actually the case: they were rewriting the history of their preferences 
to correspond with their achieved family size. 
 
 For insight into how stated preferences may be constructed, we look to the political 
science literature. Evidence that individuals’ political attitudes are unstable over time has 
long been debated in political science. That literature has much to offer in re-interpreting the 
extensive evidence of changeability of reproductive attitudes and expectations. Contrasting 
positions in the debate on political attitudes are those of Converse (1964) and Achen (1975). 
Converse’s view is that while some respondents have and report genuine opinions, large 
numbers do not have distinctive views on many subjects, but give polite more or less random 
answers to survey interview questions. Achen, on the other hand, contends that short-term 
opinion change is only apparent and is largely due to measurement error. Between these 
extremes is the position of Zaller and Feldman (1992) who argue that people do not have 
clear-cut views about every topic but are ambivalent about a range of political issues. In 
answering survey questions, respondents are, in this perspective, expressing neither 
meaningless “nonattitudes” nor unambiguous true attitudes. Rather, people will often have 
multiple considerations in mind on any specific topic, not all consistent with each other. 
Survey responses will be influenced by multiple factors, including the ideas and 
considerations uppermost in a respondent’s mind when answering a question (Zaller and 
Feldman 1992: 580). In this scheme, there need not and may not be an underlying “true” 
attitude, unlike the Converse and Achen views. Responses inconsistent at two time-points 
could reflect exactly the same set of underlying considerations, but that some are more salient 
on the first occasion than on the second. 
 
 Zaller and Feldman’s approach seems a potentially useful account of how fertility 
intentions are constructed in an interview situation. Both the high prevalence of uncertainty 
in fertility intentions, and its sensitivity to answer options available, fit well within this 
perspective. Stated preferences and intentions may be influenced by a variety of factors, both 
distant and recent in time. For example, young people with little or no experience might 
adopt a kind of Bayesian perspective (Elgamal and Grether 1995), stating as a preference 
what is essentially a prediction of their likely behaviour, based on the best evidence available 
to them at the time. Two candidate sources of information, that might function as anchors 
(Payne, Bettman and Johnson 1992, Wilson, Lindsey and Schooler 2000), are the size of their 
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own family of origin and the family sizes of which they are most aware, e.g. the distribution 
of contemporary family sizes or the modal family size in their social group or in society at 
large. Régnier-Loilier (2006) found that the sibship size of their family of origin was 
positively associated with desired family size among childless people aged under 30, but was 
not so associated among those who were already parents. Heiland et al (2008) also report a 
stronger association between family background and fertility preferences at younger than at 
older ages. There is evidence also that intended family size is less dispersed at younger than 
at older ages (Liefbroer 2009, Ní Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan 2011). Answers to fertility 
intentions or preference questions are sometimes thought of as partly normative. If this is so, 
the explanation could be that respondents look to the modal experience of others as the most 
reasonable prediction of their own future behaviour, rather than that they aspire to do as 
others do (Hayford 2009). A further possibility is that fertility intentions, both effective and 
stated, may be influenced by the effect known in psychology as “mere exposure” (Zajonc 
2001): repeated exposure to a particular stimulus, such as the size of the family of origin or of 
families in a person’s social milieu, could induce a preference. Stated intentions and 
preferences may also be influenced by current or recent considerations that are much more 
transient. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
We have been prompted to raise questions about the underlying reality of reproductive goals 
by the high prevalence of uncertain fertility intentions both in the UK and in other developed 
societies, in recent decades. Broadly defined, uncertainty is near universal at the youngest 
ages, in our GHS sample, but less common in older age groups. The level of uncertainty 
appears to have been underestimated by survey questions hitherto. Uncertainty is not, we 
propose, mainly due to faulty measurement or poorly motivated respondents. Rather, a lack 
of certainty is an inherent feature of fertility preferences and intentions. It is, furthermore, 
rational to be unsure about prospective childbearing. Support for these ideas comes from a 
range of family planning studies showing considerable ambiguity surrounding pregnancy 
intentions. In all, uncertainty in reproductive orientation appears to be both real and 
widespread in developed societies. 
 
 This array of findings, combined with long standing evidence on the instability and 
limited predictive validity of reproductive intentions and preferences, has led us to a new 
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hypothesis. Drawing on psychology and economics, we propose that fertility preferences can 
be seen as constructed—that is, generated at the point at which they are elicited or expressed, 
rather than residing fully-formed in memory. The hypothesis suggests that insofar as people 
have a family size goal, it is recognised when reached, rather than a pre-existing target. 
Women and couples are, in other words, primarily goal-achieving rather than goal-directed 
(Mcfarland 1989). An extreme version of the idea says that ultimate reproductive goals either 
do not exist or have only a weak reality, at any rate in very early adulthood, though 
preferences along the way may be sharper and clearer.  
 
 Our constructive approach to fertility intentions and preferences is currently a 
hypothesis. Modifications might well be in order. For example, people may differ in the 
certainty and clarity of fertility preferences. Some young adults may be unclear about 
whether they want to have children, while others may have a well-articulated preference 
either for some children sometime, or never to have children, ever. Also, insofar as fertility 
preferences are constructed, they may not be wholly so—some preferences may be inherent 
and stable from an early age. Debate currently surrounds the issue in the literature on 
preference construction (see Simonson 2008 and associated commentary). Finally, fertility 
preferences encompass at least three distinct questions: desire for a pregnancy/child now, 
desire for a (further) child ever, and desired number of children. A person could, for example, 
definitely wish not to have a child in the very short term, be fairly certain that they would like 
a child sometime, and be quite unsure about their preferred ultimate family size. Certainty 
and the degree of construction may well vary between these distinct preferences. 
 
5.1. TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS 
The construction hypothesis is an alternative to the account which says that survey 
respondents have true underlying preferences but these vary over time and differ from 
ultimate outcomes due to e.g. measurement error, constraint, and changes of mind. To specify 
fully how to test this hypothesis is well beyond the scope of the present paper. Our aim is 
rather to present the ideas as an alternative perspective that can help to make sense of a 
disparate set of often puzzling and unsatisfactory findings regarding fertility preferences and 
intentions. Investigating the ideas empirically is likely to be challenging. While ample 
evidence exists of genuine uncertainty in childbearing preferences and intentions, 
demonstrating empirically that these are constructed is a demanding task. In the psychology 
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and economics literature, evidence of preference construction has, thus far, been based 
largely on experiment. Non-experimental methods for identifying preference construction in 
natural settings have not been described hitherto, nor has survey data been deployed for the 
purpose. 
 
 Of the two types of preference distinguished earlier—those reported in surveys (stated 
preferences) and those that govern family formation itself (effective preferences)—stated 
preferences can be the subject of experimental investigation via e.g. studies of priming, 
variation in question style and order, and contextual effects.21 Effective preferences, however, 
are not amenable to experiment. As we have conceptualised them thus far, they are 
unobserved, and possibly unobservable. They could be thought of as a latent variable, whose 
existence and properties are probably best evaluated by developing and testing formal 
models. Several research areas in other disciplines could be drawn on for leads in this respect. 
Methods used in political science to evaluate the Converse thesis could be adapted to develop 
and interpret models of stability/instability in fertility preferences (see e.g. Brody 1986, Hill 
and Kriesi 2001). Economic models of the subjective probabilities of significant personal 
events such as survival are a further potential resource (Manski 2004, Hudomiet and Willis 
2012). Finally, less formal empirical approaches could serve to document the essential 
hypothesis, particularly the process by which preferences are constructed, which has received 
less attention than has evidence of construction itself (Simonson 2008). Small-scale 
qualitative investigation  (Schaeffer and Thomson 1992) and ethnographic work (Johnson-
Hanks 2005) can be highly informative as to process. Johnson-Hanks suggests that the 
reproductive attitudes of educated young women in Cameroon are characterised by what she 
terms “judicious opportunism”, young women having a strong sense of contingency in their 
future life course. Two lines of inquiry are suggested by these findings. First, follow up 
studies could investigate how such scepticism is transformed as the life course progresses.  
Second, the ethnographic approach might be usefully extended to developed country 
contexts, to reach for meaning and mechanism behind the standard responses to large scale 
survey questions. 
                                                 
21 See e.g. Feldman and Lynch (1988), Zaller and Feldman (1992), Wikman (2006, 2007), and Sturgis and 
Smith (2010). 
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5.2. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
If reproductive preferences are constructed to any significant extent, several unexplained 
aspects of fertility expectations become more explicable: why they are so unstable, why 
sizeable discrepancies are found between intention and outcome, and why stated fertility 
preferences and intentions, in the aggregate, reflect current rather than prospective fertility 
conditions (Westoff and Ryder 1977, Lee 1980). The relevance of the ideas extends, 
however, beyond these points. The hypothesis potentially opens a route to uncovering 
hitherto poorly understood aspects of the process of family formation itself. The constructive 
approach fits well with the reality of family building as a sequence of  decisions (Namboodiri 
1972, 1983, Udry 1983) and chimes well also with suggestions in the earlier literature that 
couples have no need of a long-run view: all they need is to decide whether they want to have 
or avoid a pregnancy in the very short term (Ryder 1973: 502, 1976: 289). Nevertheless, each 
of these authors held that preferences are revised over time, rather than, as here, generated 
over time, in the light of experience. Pursuit of the constructive preferences approach could 
ultimately answer the question as to what kind of target people and couples have in relation 
to childbearing: a fixed target, a moving one, or, perhaps, no target at all.  
 
 While we have drawn mainly on ideas from psychology, economics and political 
science, our approach also reflects recent themes in sociology. In the theoretical arena, 
Smelser’s (1998) focus on ambivalence and the difficulties it poses for rational choice models  
and Sewell’s (1992) theory of structure, positing the interdependence of structure and human 
agency, reinforce our focus on the constructive nature of preferences. Empirical sociological 
work on foresight and planning in early adulthood gives a broader life-course context for the 
ideas (Anderson, Bechhofer, Jamieson et al. 2002, Anderson, Bechhofer, Mccrone et al. 
2005). The constructive approach allows of determinants of individual preferences at 
multiple levels (Smith 1989, Hechter and Kanazawa 1997; Testa and Grilli 2006) The 
constructive view can accommodate a range of influences on both stated and effective 
preferences and intentions--from institutional, structural, historical, cultural and economic 
forces, and cohort and period effects, through to social network and idiosyncratic personal 
factors. Thus, as well as accounting for the many empirical anomalies surrounding fertility 
preferences and intentions, the constructive process provides a mechanism linking the 
aggregate with the individual level. The constructive approach to fertility intentions and 
preferences has much potential explanatory power and merits serious empirical investigation.
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